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S:BctmlTlES-APPLICATION OP ANTlnEPICIENCY JtJDGMENT STATUTE TO 
SECOND PURCHASE MoNBY TnuST Dmm Wmm:s S:sctnUTY 1s EnrAusTED BY 
FoBECLOSmtB OP FmsT Dmm-To secure the purchase price of land, defendant 
executed a promissory note and first deed of trust in favor of a savings and loan 
association, and a second note and deed in favor of plaintiff-vendor. On default 
of both obligations, the savings and loan association foreclosed upon the land. 
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The resulting sale completely exhausted the security, and plaintiff brought the 
present action upon his note. Defendant interposed section 580b of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies that "no deficiency judgment 
shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for failure of the purchaser 
to complete his [secured obligation], given to secure payment of the balance 
of the purchase price of real property.''1 The trial court and the court of 
appeals2 found the statute inapplicable. On appeal, held, reversed. A creditor 
is barred by the antideficiency judgment statute where foreclosure of a prior 
purchase money claim has consumed the security, even though no foreclosure 
sale has taken place under the second trust deed. Brown v. Jensen, (Cal. 1953) 
259 P. (2d) 425. 
If the plaintiff in the principal case had pursued the foreclosure remedy, 
the California statute clearly would have precluded a deficiency judgment.3 
The essential issue of this case is whether a secured purchase money creditor 
can avoid that limitation by proceeding on the note to enforce the personal 
liability of the debtor. A literal reading of the statute might appear to justify 
the lower courts' finding that it applies only where the trustee or mortgagee 
has foreclosed.4 However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the legislature 
looked upon foreclosure as the normal method of attack against the debtor in 
such cases, and therefore intended to abolish completely any personal obligation 
for purchase money securities.5 Indeed, another section of the California code 
dealing generally with secured obligations requires that foreclo~ure be the 
first remedy pursued, the so-called "one action" statute.6 The present decision 
prevents the junior lienor from· waiving the security for which he has con-
tracted and proceeding upon the personal obligation. Are there any special 
facts which might have justified waiver in this case? Surely the exhaustion of 
the security by sale under the prior lien cannot be relevant, because if there 
was no value in the security after foreclosure, there was equally none before.7 
The statute apparently makes no exception in favor of the lienor who has 
1 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) §580b. 
2 Brown v. Jensen, (Cal. App. 1952) 250 P. (2d) 626. 
s Kerrigan v. Maloof, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 605, 221 P. (2d) 153 (1950). 
4 This reasoning was followed in Hillen v. Soule, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 45, 45 P. (2d) 
349 (1935). But see Winkleman v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 387, 88 P. (2d) 147 (1939); 
Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. (2d) 180, 124 P. (2d) 353 (1942). 
5 Such seems to have been the belief of the court in Stone v. Lobsien, 112 Cal. App. 
(2d) 750, 247 P. (2d) 357 (1952), where it was held that there was no lending of credit 
in a promise to assume the obligations of a purchase money vendee, because §580b abol-
ished personal liability. 
6 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) §726. An early interpretation of this section 
denied waiver of the foreclosure remedy where sale under a prior lien had exhausted the 
security. Barbieri v. Ramelli, 84 Cal. 154, 23 P. 1086 (1890). Later construction permitted 
suit directly on the bond in such cases, on the ground that the particular mode of entering 
the deficiency judgment was not important, since the creditor was entitled to one in any 
event. Savings Bank v. Central Market Co., 122 Cal. 28, 54 P. 273 (1898). Clearly, 
preserving the "one action" rule does make a difference where the antideficiency prohi-
bitions upon purchase money obligations are involved, so waiver of foreclosure should 
logically not be permitted in such cases. 
7 A point made clear by Hell v. Schult, 238 Iowa 511, 28 N.W. (2d) 1 (1947). 
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accepted security which is valueless. If he wished recourse to the personal 
liability of the debtor, the vendor could have taken an unsecured note. Never-
theless, the result reached in the present case is not universally accepted. 
Guided by the notion that this type of legislation was designed to protect the 
debtor only against the creditor who takes the land in partial satisfaction at 
less than its full value and then seeks to enforce a large deficiency,8 the courts 
have frequently avoided the statute as to a creditor who receives no part of the 
security. North Carolina has a statute which abolishes deficiency judgments 
in connection with a foreclosure or sale under a power of sale of purchase money 
mortgages.9 On facts similar to the principal case, the statutory limitation was 
held inapplicable on the ground that it was intended to reach only the creditor 
who came into enjoyment of the property.10 Alabama, which had a statute 
allowing the debtor to set off the fair value of the property against the debt 
in determining a deficiency,11 found the statute inapplicable to a second lienor 
who received nothing from the first foreclosure but lost his security thereby, 
where he was not responsible for the foreclosure.12 Oregon's predepression 
statute13 has been held to prohibit personal liability only where the creditor 
elects to pursue the foreclosure, but if he does so the provision cannot be avoided 
by contractual waiver.14 Conversely, South Dakota has held its courts closed 
to all actions upon the secured purchase money note.15 It is aided in this respect 
by unmistakable statutory language.16 The early version of the North Dakota 
statute17 was held to be procedural only, demanding that the creditor go to law 
for a deficiency,18 but an amended act made it clear that creditors on secured 
obligations could not look beyond the security for satisfaction.19 The anti-
deficiency judgment acts are intended to protect debtors. They set a limit on 
the amount for which the debtor can be held liable after losing the land. If 
this is true, it should be immaterial that the debtor's obligation is divided 
among liens of different priority. Allowing the junior claimant to enforce the 
personal obligation of a purchase money note because a prior claim has absorbed 
the security places excessive weight on the form which the creditor has given 
the transaction. Such considerations strongly support California's refusal to 
8 Kerrigan v. Maloof, note 2 supra. 
o 2A N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1950) §45-21.38. 
10 Brown v. Kirkpatrick, 217 N.C. 486, 8 S.E. (2d) 601 (1940). 
llAJa. Gen. Stat. (1935) §184. 
12 Alabama Mortgage & Securities Corp. v. Chinery, 237 Ala. 198, 186 S. 136 (1939). 
13 2 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §9-505. 
14 Stretch v. Murphy, 166 Ore. 439, 112 P. (2d) 1018 (1941). 
15 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Stensland, 70 S.D. 103, 15 N.W. (2d) 8 (1944). 
1s 3 S.D. Code (1939) §39.0308. 
17 N.D. Laws (1933) 223. 
18 Burrows v. Paulson, 64 N.D. 557, 254 N.W. 471 (1934). 
10 3 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§32-1906, 32-1907. A recent amendment, N.D. Laws 
(1951) 300, allows a limited right of deficiency judgment, but no personal liability can be 
enforced except in connection with a foreclosure action. The antideliciency judgment stat-
utes of New York and Nebraska have been held not to run against actions on the note, a 
result justified in both states by reliance upon a statutory pattern which deals separately 
with foreclosure and personal actions. 
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let the creditor look beyond the security for payment. However, it may be that 
even courts holding the 'contrary view would fully enforce the limitations on 
deficiency judgments where the device of multiple liens is utilized solely for 
the purpose of avoiding the statute.20 
John Houck, S.Ed. 
20 Generally, see OsBORNB, MoBTGAGES §334. (1951). The problems raised under 
§580b by the introduction of third parties and outside security are discussed in 37 CALIP, 
L. REv. 690 (1949). 
